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Abstract 
Between 2005 and 2007 the German government raised a per-capita amount of around 
10.000 Euros for each transition out of unemployment benefit receipt into basic social care, to 
be paid by the unemployment insurance. The so called “Aussteuerungsbetrag” set strong incen-
tives that investments in active labor market programs for unemployment benefit recipients 
should pay off – in terms of an exit from registered unemployment – before a transition into 
basic social care for needy jobseekers occurred. This raised considerable public concerns that 
less programs would be granted, in particular for hard-to-place workers. Our paper analyzes if 
these concerns were justified. We compare four cohorts, eligible for unemployment benefits at 
the beginning of their unemployment spell during March of the years 2003 to 2006. We con-
duct some descriptive analyses and estimate piecewise constant exponential hazard models to 
investigate the correlation between individual characteristics and transition rates into pro-
grams. The results show that transition rates into programs were in fact low across the 2005 
cohort, but rather high for the 2006 cohort. The expectation that particular disadvantaged 
groups of unemployed would participate less in active labor market programs in the post-
reform period is not confirmed; their transition rates into programs were significantly higher 
across the 2006 cohort than in pre-reform cohorts. 
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Keywords: Participation in active labor market programs, labor market reforms in Germany, 
financing of active labor market policies, piecewise constant proportional hazard model 
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1 Introduction 
During the years 2002 and 2003 the German economy was deep in recession; the number of 
unemployed increased up to 4.4 million persons in 2003. As one consequence, the federal gov-
ernment initiated the “Agenda 2010” to reform the social system and the labor market in 
Germany. Since 2003 in the course of the so called “Hartz reforms” the German Public Em-
ployment Service was renewed, the design of several active labor market programs was modi-
fied and a number of new instruments were introduced. At the beginning of 2005 further re-
form steps were to shorten the duration of unemployment benefits considerably and to merge 
former unemployment assistance for long-term unemployed persons and former social assis-
tance into a new basic social care for needy jobseekers. As a result of the reforms, many for-
mer social assistance recipients had to register as unemployed and to apply for basic social 
care for needy jobseekers. During the first quarter of 2005 the number of registered unem-
ployed increased to more than 5 millions. Currently the unemployment rate has decreased 
notably. The boom started in the middle of the year 2006 and the economic situation devel-
oped positively at least until 2007, where the number of unemployed decreased to 3.8 million 
persons.  
Our paper is mainly concerned with the transitions of unemployed persons in active labor mar-
ket programs. Between 2005 and 2007 the German government raised a per-capita amount of 
around 10.000 Euros for each transition out of (insurance-financed) unemployment benefit 
receipt into (tax-financed) basic social care, to be paid by the unemployment insurance. This 
“penalty tax” set economic incentives for the unemployment insurance to invest preferentially 
in active labor market programs if investments noticeably increased the probability of an un-
employment benefits recipient to exit unemployment before a transition to basic social care 
occurred. Public concerns were expressed that less active labor market programs would be 
granted for hard-to-place unemployed benefit recipients.  
We investigate empirically how program entries and the selectivity into programs have devel-
oped in the course of the reforms and if the concerns mentioned above were justified. To get 
comparable samples of individuals across years, we choose a cohort approach: We analyze 
entries into unemployment benefit receipt during March of the years 2003 to 2006 and follow 
these cohorts for the course of one year. We first compute transition rates into programs for 
each cohort over the observation period of one year. Second, we apply a piecewise-constant 
proportional hazard model to investigate if transition rates into active labor market programs 
were correlated with particular individual characteristics and if transition rates decreased for 
particular hard-to-place unemployed persons. 
Section 2 describes in more detail the institutional setting of German labor market policies 
and some of the changes this system has undergone during recent years (see Konle-Seidl 2008 
for a more comprehensive overview). Section 3 develops some hypotheses, while Section 4 
sketches data, variables and applied method. Our empirical results are depicted in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
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2 Institutional background 
2.1 The reform of the German system of unemployment compensation 
A major part of the social reform processes initiated in Germany at the beginning of the mil-
lennium regarded the system of unemployment compensation. Unemployed persons who had 
contributed to the German unemployment insurance system are eligible for unemployment 
benefits (“Arbeitslosengeld I”), which amounts up to 67 percent of the latest net income and is 
paid for a restricted period of time. Since 2006 the maximum duration of unemployment 
benefits paid by the unemployment insurance system has been shortened considerably and has 
only currently been prolonged again for older workers (see Overview 1). The legal basis for the 
unemployment insurance system is provided by the Social Code III (“Sozialgesetzbuch III”). 
Traditionally, the German Public Employment Service has been responsible for the administra-
tion of the unemployment insurance as well as for the placement of registered unemployed 
persons. 
When unemployment benefits had phased out, until 2005 former unemployment benefit re-
cipients were supported by means-tested and tax-financed unemployment assistance (“Arbeit-
slosenhilfe”). Its amount was also conditional on former income; its administration was con-
ducted through the Public Employment Service. Needy persons not capable of work and with-
out claims for unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance could apply for means-
tested social assistance (“Sozialhilfe”), which was administered by local municipalities. Even if 
capable of work, many of them were not registered as unemployed at the Public Employment 
Service. Note that when proving “neediness” the entire household income is taken into ac-
count. 
Overview 1: 
Maximum duration of unemployment benefits in Germany 
Up to 2/2006 2/2006-12/2007* From 1/2008 
Age Months Age Months Age Months 
Up to 45 12 Up to 55 12 Up to 50 12 
45-46 18 55 or older 18 50-54 15 
47-51 22  55-57 18 
52-56 26  58 or older 24 
57 or older 32   
*) While enacted already since 2004, these changes did not take force until February 1, 2006, because of 
protection of confidence. 
With the beginning of 2005 the Social Code II (“Sozialgesetzbuch II”) came into force: Former 
unemployment assistance and social assistance were abolished. Now needy unemployed job 
seekers are entitled to tax-financed basic social care (“Arbeitslosengeld II”), whose amount 
does not depend on former income. They mostly have to register as unemployed; only those 
not capable of working for at least three hours a day – due to illness or disability – may still 
receive basic social care without having to register as unemployed (“Sozialhilfe neu”). The ad-
ministration of the new services is mostly conducted by joint consortia (“Arbeitsgemein-
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schaften”) of the Public Employment Service and local municipalities, where the former is re-
sponsible in particular for unemployment compensation, placement services and activation. 
Accordingly, the German Public Employment Service is now organized in two branches, an 
insurance-funded branch, based on the Social Code III, and a tax-funded branch, based on the 
Social Code II. An exception was made for 69 municipalities who opted out of this cooperation 
and provide all services for needy jobseekers on their own (“optierende Kommunen”).  
Overview 2 summarizes information on the funding of passive as well as of active labor market 
programs before and after the reform. We are interested in particular in the shaded areas that 
describe situations in which active labor market policies were financed mainly by the unem-
ployment insurance system. An interesting construction is that in the pre-reform period most 
active labor market programs for unemployment assistance recipients has been financed from 
unemployment insurance funds, while active labor market programs for needy job seekers are 
now financed by taxes. As a kind of compensation between 2005 and 2007 a per-capita 
amount of around 10.000 Euro (“Aussteuerungsbetrag”) had to be transferred from the unem-
ployment insurance’s budget to the government’s budget for each transition from unemploy-
ment benefits into basic social care for needy job seekers, which took place within three 
months after unemployment benefits had run out. Note that this per-capita payment has only 
recently been abolished (January 1, 2008) and been replaced by a lump-sum payment of 5 
billion Euros that has to be transferred from the unemployment insurance system to the Fed-
eral Government yearly.  
Overview 2: 
Financing of passive and active labor market policies 
  Recipients of … 
Financing up to 2005 Unemployment benefits Unemployment assistance Social assistance 
Passive labor market policies Unemployment insurance Taxes Taxes 
Active labor market policies Unemployment insurance Taxes 
Administration Public Employment Services  (only Social Code III branch) Municipalities 
        
  
Recipients of … 
Financing since 2005 Unemployment benefits Basic social care  for needy jobseekers 
Passive labor market policies Unemployment insurance Taxes 
Active labor market policies Unemployment insurance Taxes 
…transition Per-capita transfer from  unemployment insurance to government's budget 
Administration Public Employment Services (Social Code III branch) Public Employment Services (Social Code II branch) and/or municipalities 
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2.2 Active labor market programs in Germany 
As has already been mentioned, in the course of the labor market reforms the design of several 
active labor market programs was modified since 2003 and a number of new instruments was 
introduced. In the following we will present a brief overview on the main instruments of active 
labor market policies administered by the German Public Employment Service (see Bernhard et 
al. 2008 for a comprehensive overview on instruments and evaluation results). Table 1 shows 
entries and average number of participants in selected programs for the period 2000 to 2006. 
Since 2005 these numbers include also program entries of basic social care recipients. 
Targeted wage subsidies (“Eingliederungszuschüsse” EGZ), paid to employers for a fixed period 
of time, support a direct integration of unemployed persons in the regular labor market. They 
gained importance in East Germany following the reunification and there after again in the 
late nineties, but lost importance until 2005. From 1998 to 2003 three main variants were in 
place: One required that the employer reasoned special training requirements, one was aimed 
at hard-to-place unemployed with severe problems of reintegration and one subsidized work-
ers of age 50 and older. The “Hartz” reforms collapsed these into a single wage subsidy for 
hard-to-place workers, with a looser definition of target groups and less generous financial 
support. In the discretion of the caseworker, up to 50 percent of wages may be reimbursed for 
up to 12 months. Until 2004 several similar wage subsidy programs have also been adminis-
tered by the Public Employment Service (see Jaenichen 2000). Among smaller programs, there 
are subsidies for hires in newly founded firms, for the support of severely disabled individuals 
and for the promotion of job rotation. 
Further vocational training (“Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung”) encompasses a number of 
different treatments, which can be broadly classified in qualification programs, training in 
“practice firms” (that offer practical occupational training without trainees actually working in 
a real company) and long retraining measures. The duration varies considerably between some 
months up to two ore three years for retraining programs. Since the year 2003 access to fur-
ther training programs is granted through vouchers; issuing a training voucher to an unem-
ployed person is in the discretion of the caseworker. Vouchers specify the training target, pro-
gram duration, the regional scope and the period of validity (up to 3 months). Kruppe (2008) 
investigates in detail which of those receiving a voucher in fact redeemed it. For a long time 
further vocational training belonged to the most important programs in Germany. However, 
during the first half of this decade entries as well as the duration of these measures were 
shrinking, while – also due the increasing demand for skilled personnel – the number of entries 
increased again in 2006.  
Previously very important programs for job creation in the public sector (“Arbeitsbeschaf-
fungsmaßnahmen und Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen” ABM and SAM) nearly disappeared 
until 2004. However, since 2005 a new variant of public job creation for long-term unem-
ployed (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten” AGH) is the most important program for unemployed recipients 
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of basic social care. This program provides mostly only a modest additional reimbursement for 
work (“Ein-Euro-Jobs”). 
Table 1: 
Entries and average numbers in selected labor market programs during 2000-2006 (in 
1000) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006* 
      II/III III II/III III 
Entries into program                   
Wage subsidy (“Eingliederungszuschüsse”) 152 127 188 183 157 134 83 217 120 
Further vocational training (“Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung”) 523 442 455 255 185 132 66 247 144 
Public job creation I (“Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM”) 318 246 215 179 161 80 18 80 18 
Public job creation II (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten”) - - - - - 630 - 742 - 
Short-term training (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”) 485 551 865 1064 1188 894 484 978 534 
Start-up subsidy I (“Überbrückungsgeld”) 93 96 125 159 183 157 157 108 108 
Start-up subsidy II (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”) - - - 95 168 91 91 43 43 
Start-up subsidy III (“Gründungszuschuss”) - - - - - - - 34 34 
Contracting-out to private agencies ("Beauftragung  Dritter")** - - - - 635 426 153 301 153 
Temporary help-firms ("Personal-Service-Agenturen") - - - 45 56 27 24 16 11 
Average number in program                   
Wage subsidy (“Eingliederungszuschüsse”) 105 118 136 153 110 60 39 82 14 
Further vocational training (“Förderung berufl. Weiterbildung”) 343 352 340 260 184 114 96 119 72 
Public job creation I (“Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, SAM”) 266 237 193 144 117 61 49 50 43 
Public job creation II (“Arbeitsgelegenheiten”) - - - - - 201 - 293 - 
Short-term training (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”) 52 60 74 93 95 69 35 70 35 
Start-up subsidy I (“Überbrückungsgeld”) 43 46 56 73 84 83 83 63 63 
Start-up subsidy II (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”) - - - 40 151 234 234 210 210 
Start-up subsidy III (“Gründungszuschuss”) - - - - - - - 8 8 
Contracting-out to private agencies ("Beauftragung  Dritter")** - - - - 95 103 28 100 24 
Temporary help-firms ("Personal-Service-Agenturen") - - - 10 25 13 12 6 4 
Source: Statistics of the German Public Employment Service (Data-Warehouse). 
*) II/III = Programs in the realm of the Social Code II (without “optierende Kommunen”) and the Social 
Code III; III = Programs in the realm of the Social Code III. 
**) Figures are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out of 
subtasks) respectively 2002 (contracting-out of entire placement).  
Short training programs (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”) have been used increasingly over time, in 
particular during 2003 and 2004. Their durations do in most cases not exceed two months. 
They are utilized to train qualifications and abilities, to test the availability of the unemployed, 
to check whether unemployed are suited for further longer-term measures and to provide help 
in job search through application training. These programs are conducted partly within firms 
and partly firm-external. 
Two programs offering financial support for unemployed persons founding their own busi-
nesses were increasingly utilized until 2006: A first variant (“Überbrückungsgeld”) encouraged 
unemployed persons to found a new business by proceeding to pay unemployment benefits as 
well as a subsidy to social security contributions for six months. The “Hartz” reforms in 2003 
additionally introduced a second variant of a start-up subsidy (“Existenzgründungszuschuss”), 
which provided a fixed, but time-decreasing amount for up to three years and was attractive 
for unemployed persons who received rather low unemployment benefits. In August 2006 both 
programs were collapsed in a new variant of a start-up subsidy (“Gründungszuschuss”). Start-
up subsidies differ from most other active labor market programs since caseworkers have no 
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discretion in granting the subsidy – any unemployed person with further benefits entitlements 
and providing a convincing business plan has a legal entitlement to the subsidy. Furthermore, 
the period of subsidization does not shorten the duration of further unemployment benefit 
entitlements. 
Contracting-out to private placement services gained importance during the last years in Ger-
many. Unemployed persons may ask for a voucher that entitles them to use the services of a 
private placement agency or may be assigned to private agencies that compete on a quasi-
market (“Beauftragung privater Dritter”). While unemployment benefit recipients have the 
legal right to demand a voucher after two months of unemployment and to demand assign-
ment to a private placement agency after half a year of unemployment, participation is mostly 
not the result of such demands. Furthermore, temporary help firms may employ previous un-
employed persons while receiving financial reimbursement from the Public Employment Ser-
vice (“Personal-Service-Agenturen”). 
An increasing number of evaluation studies investigates the effects of these programs on the 
labor market prospects of participants, comparing a treatment group with a similar group of 
unemployed persons that participate never or only later in a program. After a lock-in period 
generally significant positive effects have been found for wage subsidies (Jaenichen/Stephan 
2007) and start-up subsidies (Baumgartner/Caliendo 2007). A considerable number of papers 
investigates the effectiveness of further vocational training programs (see for instance Biewen 
et al. 2007, Fitzenberger et al. 2006, Fitzenberger/Völter 2007, Lechner et al. 2005, 2007, 
Rinne et al. 2007). The results imply that further vocational training programs had in the 
longer run mostly significant positive effects on the employment prospects of participants. 
However, since program effects are rather weak, it may take some time until the estimated 
program effect turns positive. Caliendo et al. (2005a, 2005b, 2006), Hujer/Thomsen (2006) and 
Hohmeyer/Wolff (2007) showed that participation in a public job creation schemes had in the 
longer run mostly negative or insignificant effect on the labor market prospects of partici-
pants. The picture is mixed for short training programs (Wolff/Jozwiak 2007, Stephan et al. 
2006): They seem to improve the labor market prospects of participants considerably if con-
ducted within a firm, while firm-external short training programs exert much lower effects. 
Regarding contracting-out, Bernhard/Wolff (2008) obtained slightly positive effects of an as-
signment to private placement agencies, while Winterhager et al. (2006) found positive effects 
of placement vouchers on employment probabilities. 
Finally, the development of program participation has to be seen against the background that 
during the year 2004 also the German Public Employment Service had been reorganized and 
renewed. Among other things, caseworkers were challenged to invest funds for active labor 
market programs effectively and efficiently. Unemployment benefit recipients were – as result 
of a profiling – clustered into four groups, which were characterized as market customers, 
customers in need of activation, customers in need of support and welfare customers 
(“Marktkunden”, “Beratungskunden Aktivieren”, “Beratungskunden Fördern”, “Betreuungskun-
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den”). While market customers were supposed to be not in need of further activities than 
placement advice, customers in need of activation or support were assessed to benefit from 
further activities of caseworkers – the former lacking in motivation, the latter requiring quali-
fication or subsidization. In contrast, welfare customers were evaluated as very difficult to 
place in the labor market, thus further spending on active labor market programs would 
probably be “wasted” on them. Tailor-made programs for the treatment of these groups of 
customers had been laid down in manuals for caseworkers (“Handlungsprogramme”) and came 
into effect since 2004. Their aim is to provide individual help for those unemployed persons 
who need it and who are expected to profit from it. 
3 Hypotheses 
As has already been noted, from 2005 to 2007 a per-capita payment (“Aussteuerungsbetrag”) 
from unemployment insurance funds to the government budget was due for each transition 
from unemployment benefits to basic social care. This was justified by the German government 
with the fact that the Social-Code-III branch of the Public Employment Service would now 
save costs for active labor market programs for former unemployment assistance recipients, 
which has been financed by unemployment insurance funds before the reforms took place. 
Furthermore the transfer was meant to set an incentive for the Public Employment Service to 
get unemployment benefits recipients into employment or at least out of registered unem-
ployment before they became entitled to tax-financed basic social care.  
However, since the beginning of 2005 this clearly introduced also an undesired incentive for 
caseworkers in the realm of the Social Code III. From an economic point of view, an invest-
ment into an active labor market program for a recipient of unemployment benefits required 
that the investment increased his or her probability to leave unemployment to a sufficient 
amount (see Bender et al., 2006, for a detailed discussion). Furthermore, this exit has to occur 
– and this is the critical implication of the per-capita transfer – before an entry into basic 
social care for needy jobseekers occurred. That would be, however, more difficult for unem-
ployed with low qualification and elder workers. Thinking further, caseworkers might have 
even assigned in particular those individuals into programs, who were – when employed – 
main earner within the household context. This would be in particular married men. In con-
trast, married women are comparatively often second-earner within a household and would 
thus not be entitled to basic social care if their husbands earn a sufficiently high income. Also 
the effects of programs had to manifest themselves quickly, thus making it less attractive to 
grant participation in long-term active labor market programs. 
It is therefore not surprising that the implementation of the per-capita-payment raised con-
siderable concerns. Adamy (2005) noted that the new financial architecture reduced funds 
available for the integration of unemployment benefits recipients. He predicted that less and 
cheaper active labor programs would be put into action. In particular, further vocational train-
ing programs might be substituted by short training programs. Also program participation was 
supposed to concentrate on those unemployed benefit recipients with rather good prospects of 
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re-integration in the labor market (Bender et al. 2006). The left-wing political party “Die 
LINKE” stated the per-capita payment contributed to increase labor market segregation 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2007). 
Due to public concerns and the initiative of its supervisory board (“Verwaltungsrat”) the Public 
Employment Service counter-steered since 2006, devoting considerable additional funds to 
active labor market programs – despite the incentive structure implemented by the govern-
ment. Also, particular programs were launched to promote less qualified and older unemploy-
ment benefits recipients in the realm of the Social Code III (“Sonderprogramm zur Stärkung der 
Qualifikation der Personengruppe der Geringqualifizierten und Älteren, WeGebAU”, “Sonder-
programm Integrationsfortschritte für Betreuungskunden, IfB”). Both groups face particular 
placement difficulties in the labor market. 
Against this background, we compare four cohorts of persons who became eligible for unem-
ployment benefits during March 2003 to 2006. We want to test the following hypotheses, 
which are all related to the fact that investments in active labor market programs for unem-
ployment benefit seemed in particular worthwhile if they contributed to an exit out of unem-
ployment before an entry into basic social care took place: 
 First, transition rates into active labor market programs in the realm of the Social Code III 
have been lower for the 2005 than for former cohorts. However, because of active counter-
steering of the Public Employment Service this will not necessarily be the case for the 2006 
cohort.  
 Second, less programs of long duration could have been granted for unemployment benefit 
recipients of the post-reform periods. On the one hand programs of longer duration might 
have generally been substituted through comparatively cheap short training programs. On 
the other hand average program durations – in particular of wage subsidies and further vo-
cational training – might have decreased. 
 Third, one could suppose that program participations of unemployment benefit recipients 
have in average started earlier during an unemployment spell after the per-capita transfer 
has been introduced. 
 Fourth, investment in active labor market programs may have seemed in particular risky for 
low-qualified and elder worker (in our empirical analysis workers older than 50) as well as 
for married women, but more worthwhile for married men. Transition rates into programs 
might thus have decreased in post-reform years for the former groups and increased for the 
latter. 
These hypotheses cannot be analyzed using data from the Statistics of the Public Employment 
Service (see Table 1), since we need samples that are in fact comparable across years; this 
requires the use of micro-data.  
However, a confirmation of the hypotheses stated above does not provide direct evidence on 
undesired effects of the per-capita transfer, since we cannot disentangle its impact from ef-
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fects of the organizational changes within the Public Employment Service and of reforms of 
the system of unemployment compensation. A confirmation might rather be interpreted as 
indirect evidence that the concern stated above were justified. 
4 Data and applied method 
4.1 Data and variables 
We utilize data from the TrEffeR database of the German Public Employment Service. For 
monitoring purposes, TrEffeR (Treatment Effects and Prediction) provides – on a very detailed 
level – on-going evaluation results for active labor market programs (Stephan et al. 2006). The 
current version merges data flows from the distinct computer based operative systems of the 
Public Employment Service on periods of registered job search, registered unemployment and 
participation in labor market programs for the period 2000 to the middle of 2007. It’s also 
possible to add information on employment spells to these data; this has, however, not been 
done for the analysis at hand.  
Table 2 shows that the data set contains fewer entries in unemployment than published by the 
Statistics of the Public Employment Services (Panel I and II): In particular re-entries into regis-
tered unemployment following program participation are not interpreted as new entries into 
unemployment. For instance, short gaps between unemployment spells (up to seven days), as 
well as gaps arising from sickness periods (up to 6 weeks) are bridged. Overall entries into 
labor market programs will be slightly under-registered in the data, since not all programs are 
integrated in the computer based systems of the Public Employment Service. In particular, 
different variants of contracting-out to private placement agencies started already in the year 
1998 (contracting-out of sub-tasks) respectively 2002 (contracting-out of entire placement 
tasks). Information on participation, however, has been included in the data prior to 2004. 
Receipt of a placement voucher is not covered by the data at all. 
We apply several additional restrictions to the data. Our data set consists first of all individuals 
entering registered unemployment during March of the years 2003 to 2006. We follow the 
labor market history of these individuals over the course of one year. Second, we include only 
individuals into our analysis, who were of age 25 to 54 at the inflow date in our sample. This 
selection excludes on the one hand individuals eligible for specific programs for youth unem-
ployed. On the other hand unemployed persons older than 58 do not have to register as 
searching anymore and often withdraw from the labor market. Also since February 2006 the 
duration of unemployment benefits was shortened to 12 months for all individuals up to 55. 
Third, only entries of unemployment benefit recipients were investigated. Note that up to the 
beginning of 2005 these persons may run out of claims during their unemployment spell and 
receive unemployment assistance or no funding at all, while still eligible to active labor market 
programs financed by the unemployment insurance. Fourth, only individuals who have been 
out of unemployment for at least three months are included. Fifth, since 2005 the data of the 
Public Employment Service are partly incomplete as a consequence of the already mentioned 
last “Hartz” labor market reform, which reallocated responsibilities for long-term unemployed 
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persons between the Public Employment Service and municipalities. Data flows from those 69 
municipalities opting out of the co-operation with the Public Employment Service (“optierende 
Kommunen”) have not been entirely integrated yet. For individuals from these municipalities 
we cannot distinguish between times of unemployment, times in programs and times out of 
registered unemployment. To get comparable data sets across years, we decided to drop all 
individuals from local offices (“Geschäftsstellen”) of the Public Employment Service, whose 
clients may have switched into the responsibility of one of these municipalities since 2005. 
Individuals, for whom no information on the local offices was available, were dropped from the 
data set if they were registered in 64 of 180 local labor market areas (“Agenturbezirke”) that 
include at least one of these municipalities. Fifth, the participation in start-up subsidy pro-
grams is not comparable to participation in other programs since unemployed with further 
benefit entitlements have also a legal entitlement to participate in the program (see Section 
2.2). Thus we exclude all individuals taking up subsidized self-employment during the analyzed 
period from further analysis. 
Table 2:  
Number of observations 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
I. Statistics of the German Public Employment Service         
Entry into registered unemployment during March 605070 639262 591370 587751 
II. TrEffeR data and steps of selection         
1) Entry into registered unemployment during March 437758 424383 412236 510735 
2) Age between 25 and 54 301832 291670 278885 314200 
3) Receipt unemployment benefits at beginning of spell 148325 134616 127354 109010 
4) At least 90 days not registered 127307 105622 102082 84539 
5) Excluding areas with incomplete data since 2005 103528 85288 82107 68273 
6) Excluding persons taking-up a start-up subsidy 97286 79893 77502 64075 
III. Transitions         
A. Program in realm of the Social Code III 25539 22372 14698 15794 
B1. Program with duration of less than 100 days 19170 19251 13060 13437 
B2. Program with duration of 100 days and longer 8999 5038 2614 3970 
C1. Wage subsidy program 2953 1446 1215 1851 
C2. Further vocational training 4058 2852 1500 3108 
C3. Public job creation scheme 2365 602 140 145 
C4. Short training program 16767 13444 9664 9655 
D. Basic social care for needy jobseekers - 8564 9635 5878 
E. Not registered as unemployment and not in program 63008 54045 57748 50243 
Source: Statistics of the German Public Employment Service (Data-Warehouse)  
and TrEffeR data set of the German Public Employment Service (own calculations). 
Only program entries while in the realm of the Social Code III; transitions into start-up subsidy programs 
are excluded. Individuals may enter more than one program variant during their unemployment spell. 
Table 2 displays step by step (Panel II) how many observations remain in our sample due to 
these restrictions: In each of the four years investigated our dataset contained around 400,000 
to 500,000 persons that registered as unemployed during March of the respective year. Around 
three quarter of these belonged to the age group investigated, between 25 and 54. Only one 
third (2006) to one half (2003) of these received unemployment benefits at the beginning of 
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their unemployment episode. Around 50,000 of those remaining had been less than 90 days 
out of registered unemployment at the beginning of their spell, were from local labor markets 
where municipalities opted out of the cooperation with the Public Employment Service or par-
ticipated in a start-up subsidy program. As a consequence, the analyzed dataset contains for 
each of the years investigated between 65,000 and 100,000 observations.  
We will first investigate the overall risk to enter any active labor market program while in the 
realm of the Social Code III (excepting start-up subsidies, as has been explained above), thus 
treating all programs as one. Second, we distinguish between “short” and “long” programs, 
setting the border somewhat arbitrarily at 100 days of program participation. Third we sepa-
rately analyze entries into the main “traditional” program variants (not necessarily the first 
program entry during the spell): These are wage subsidies, further vocational training pro-
grams, public job creation schemes as well as short training programs. In particular subsidiza-
tion by wage subsidies and further vocational training programs may still vary considerably in 
length within these categories. In the second and third step we take into account that a per-
son may enter different program variants while in the realm of the Social Code III. Fourth, we 
have also a look at competing risks, which are in particular a transfer into basic social care or 
an exit out of unemployment.  
For the sample investigated, Panel III of Table 2 shows also the number of transitions into 
programs, into basic social care for needy job seekers and out of unemployment for each of 
the years investigated. Short program participations are obviously much more common that 
longer participations of more than 100 days. In line with this, short training programs are the 
most commonly utilized program variant. In contrast, only few cohort members participated in 
public job creation schemes.  
As explaining variables we include in our multivariate analysis first the region (East Germany 
versus West Germany). Second, we control for socio-demographic characteristics, measured at 
the start of an unemployment spell, in particular sex and marital status (also interacted), na-
tionality, health problems, degree of disablement, education and age group. Third, several vari-
ables describe the unemployment-history in the both years preceding the analyzed unemploy-
ment spell, measured at the start of this spell, are included. These are times of unemployment, 
participation in labor market programs, sanctions and periods of illness. Fourth, to test our 
final hypotheses – that access to programs has changed over time in particular for married 
men, married women, unemployed with low qualification and elder workers (those between 
age of 50 and 54) – we also include interactions of these variables with the year of unem-
ployment entry into our estimates.  
Means of the descriptive variables – all specified as dummy variables – can be found in Table 
3. The sample analyzed is rather similar across cohorts regarding individual characteristics. We 
add some information on the already mentioned “customer classification” of the Public Em-
ployment Service. However, the share of unemployed persons, for whom no classification was 
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available, is very high across earlier cohorts. Thus we do not include this variable in our further 
analysis. 
Table 3:  
Means of descriptive variables 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 
East Germany 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.23 
Unmarried man 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.31 
Unmarried woman 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 
Married man 0.30 0.28 0.31 0.29 
Married woman 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.21 
Foreigner 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Slightly disabled 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Severly disabled 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Health problems 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 
Without school leaving certificate 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Lower secondary degree (Hauptschule) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.39 
Intermediate secondary degree (Realschule) 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Higher secondary degree (Gymnasium) 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.17 
Without vocational training 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.21 
Vocational training 0.69 0.68 0.71 0.70 
University degree 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 
Age 25-29 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.20 
Age 30-34 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Age 35-39 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 
Age 40-44 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Age 45-49 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.15 
Ind
ivid
ua
l c
ha
rac
ter
ist
ics
 
Age 50-54 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Labor market program(s) 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Period(s) of sickness 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 
Sanction(s) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Unemployed up to 1 month 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.62 
Unemployed 1-6 months 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.24 
Unemployed 7-12 months 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 
Unemployed 13-18 months 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 2
-ye
ars
-h
ist
ory
 
Unemployed 19-24 months 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Market custumer 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.34 
Customer in need of activation 0.01 0.03 0.25 0.29 
Customer in need of program 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.16 
Welfare customer 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.17 Cla
ssi
fic
ati
on
 
No classification available 0.97 0.89 0.24 0.04   Observations 97286 79893 77502 64075 
Source: TrEffeR data set of the German Public Employment Service (own calculations). 
4.2 Applied method 
Our data are organized as episodes. We will first present some descriptive evidence on flows 
and stocks for the cohorts investigated. Second, we apply event history analysis (see for in-
stance Lancaster 1990, or for an overview Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 20) to investigate the risk 
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of entering an active labor market program and to explore the relationship between selectivity 
into programs and individual characteristics. 
Overview 3 displays the basic classification of transitions underlying our analysis. We are 
mainly interested in the transitions of unemployed persons into active labor market programs 
while in the realm of the Social Code III. Let T be the duration of unemployment until a pro-
gram entry occurs. The transition rate respectively hazard rate λ(t) to enter a program at time 
t is determined by the probability P to take up the program during a time interval h following 
t, conditional until being still unemployed in t. It is formally given by  
(1) λ(t) = limh→0 P(t ≤ T < t + h | T ≥ t) / h 
For a descriptive inspection of transition we will first present figures of smoothed hazard rates, 
with a bandwidth of 30 days. The smoothed value at a given time is given by the weighted 
average of all values in the neighborhood of that time point, where weights are determined by 
choice of a kernel function. Since graphs commonly encounter bias when estimating near the 
boundaries of the observation period, we apply an Epanechnikov kernel adjusted at the bound-
ary regions. 
Overview 3: 
Classification of transitions 
up to 2005
since 2005
Entry into registered unemployment 
receiving unemployment benefits
Entry into program while in realm of Social Code III
Exit out of registered unemployment (censors 
program entries and transitions into Social Code II)
Exit out of registered unemployment 
(censors program entries)
Entry into program while in realm of Social Code III
Transition into realm of Social Code II 
(censors program entries)
 
As can be seen also from Overview 3, several competing risks are present in our analysis. In 
particular, individuals may register out of unemployment or change into basic social care for 
needy jobseekers (the latter since the beginning of 2005), before they have entered a program 
in the realm of the Social Code III. These observations are then treated as censored at time of 
the respective transition, since they are dropping out of the risk set. However, we cannot as-
sume independence between the event and the censoring distribution: On the one hand indi-
viduals with good labor market prospects will exit unemployment with a higher probability 
than the average person, on the other hand in particular hard-to-place individuals will enter 
basic social care for needy individuals before taking up a program in the realm of the Social 
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Code III. That implies that those individuals remaining in the risk-set over time are not repre-
sentative for the censored individuals. We thus compute also an unconditional representation 
of labor market flows, the cumulative incidence of transitions until the end of each quarter. 
Furthermore, we present the stock of individuals at the end of each quarter. 
Turning to the multivariate estimates, we are mainly interested in the question what has hap-
pened to those who remained in the risk set, independently from consequences of censoring. 
We expect that this hazard rate will be correlated with individual characteristics – summa-
rized in the vector x – as well as with the elapsed duration of unemployment at each point of 
time. We estimate a piecewise-constant exponential hazard model, which allows a very flexi-
ble parameterization of the hazard rate. This model belongs to the class of proportional hazard 
models that may be very generally written as 
(2) λ(t;x) = κ(x) λ0(t), 
where λ0(t) > 0 is the so-called baseline hazard rate. The underlying assumption is that all 
covariates included into the model shift the baseline hazard rate proportionally. In other 
words, the impact of covariates is assumed not to vary over time already spent in the unem-
ployment episode. Using an exponential transition rate approach, we parameterize κ(x) as 
exp(xβ), with β as a vector of parameters to be estimated. Furthermore, in the piecewise-
constant proportional hazard model λ0(t) is assumed to differ over specified time intervals am-1 
≤ t ≤ am and may thus be written as λm(am-1 ≤ t ≤ am). In our analysis we will estimate sepa-
rate risks for each quarter of unemployment duration. Taking logs we obtain 
(3) log λ(t;x) = xβ + αm(am+1 ≤ t ≤ am), 
with αm = log λm. For each variable xj from x the parameter βj can be interpreted as the semi-
elasticity of the hazard with respect to xj. This model can be estimated using maximum likeli-
hood methods.  
If one is interested rather in representative estimates for all individuals – not only those re-
maining in the risk-set – introducing unobserved heterogeneity might alleviate the conse-
quences of censoring mentioned above. In the majority of the literature this is done by assum-
ing that unobserved heterogeneity is captured by an unobserved constant, which is identically 
gamma-distributed for all individuals, not correlated with observed covariates and enters the 
hazard rate multiplicatively (mixed model). 
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Table 4:  
Cumulative incidence of transitions and share within each state during one year after en-
try into unemployment benefit receipt (cohorts March 2003-2006, in percent) 
  I II III 
  Cumulated incidence*  of transitions  
up to end of … quarter 
Share at the end of … 
quarter Mean duration 
 
March 
cohort of 
year 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4  
2003 11 18 24 26 5 8 10 10 96 
2004 15 22 27 28 7 8 9 6 62 
2005 9 14 18 19 4 4 5 4 52 
A. Program in the realm of 
the Social Code III 
2006 12 19 24 25 6 7 8 6 55 
2003 9.1 13.6 17.6 19.7 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.2 32 
2004 12.9 18.9 23.1 24.1 3.7 3.1 2.9 1.2 31 
2005 8.4 12.5 15.8 16.9 2.5 2.0 2.3 1.2 33 
B1. Program with  
duration of less than 100 
days 2006 10.6 16.3 20.0 21.0 3.6 3.3 2.7 1.5 32 
2003 2.4 5.1 7.9 9.3 2.5 5.0 7.1 6.4 299 
2004 2.2 4.0 5.5 6.3 2.8 4.2 4.5 3.6 282 
2005 1.0 1.9 2.8 3.4 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.6 227 
B2. Program with  
duration of 100 days and 
longer 2006 1.6 3.7 5.3 6.2 1.6 3.3 3.6 2.8 203 
2003 1.0 2.0 2.6 3.0 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5 203 
2004 0.4 1.1 1.5 1.8 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.7 145 
2005 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 129 
C1. Wage subsidy  
program 
2006 0.6 1.6 2.3 2.9 0.6 1.3 1.5 1.4 140 
2003 1.5 2.5 3.7 4.2 1.0 1.7 2.6 2.3 299 
2004 1.7 2.6 3.4 3.6 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.1 235 
2005 0.8 1.2 1.8 1.9 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 155 
C2. Further vocational  
training program 
2006 1.7 3.2 4.5 4.9 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.3 119 
2003 0.5 1.2 2.2 2.4 0.4 1.2 2.0 1.5 211 
2004 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 191 
2005 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 199 
C3. Public job creation 
scheme 
2006 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 180 
2003 8.4 12.3 15.7 17.2 2.0 1.6 1.9 1.2 27 
2004 8.9 13.1 16.1 16.8 1.9 1.4 1.3 0.4 23 
2005 6.3 9.3 11.6 12.5 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.6 23 
C4. Short training pro-
gram 
2006 7.8 11.6 14.3 15.1 1.7 1.1 0.9 0.5 21 
2003 - - - - - - - - - 
2004 - - - 11 - - - 13 - 
2005 5 8 10 12 3 5 7 10 - 
D. Basic social care for 
needy job seekers 
2006 5 6 8 9 4 3 4 4 - 
2003 28 46 58 65 26 39 45 46 - 
2004 30 48 60 68 27 40 47 47 - 
2005 35 55 67 75 32 47 55 54 - 
E. Not registered as  
unemployed  
and not in program** 2006 41 60 71 78 37 53 61 63 - 
Source: TrEffeR data set of the German Public Employment Service (own calculations). 
Only program entries while in the realm of the Social Code III; transitions into start-up subsidy programs 
are excluded. Individuals may enter more than one program variant during their unemployment spell.  
*) First entry out of the unemployment spell into the particular category has occurred until between 
unemployment entry and end of the quarter. Duration until program entry is censored at unemployment 
exit and at exit into realm of Social Code II. 
**) In realm neither of Social code III nor of Social Code II.  
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Figure 1:  
Transition rates during one year after entry into unemployment benefit receipt (cohorts 
March 2003-2006) 
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Source: TrEffeR data set of the German Public Employment Service (own calculations). 
Only program entries while in the realm of the Social Code III; transitions into start-up subsidy programs 
are excluded. Individuals may enter more than one program variant during their unemployment spell. 
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5 Empirical results 
5.1 Transitions into programs 
We observe four cohorts taking up unemployment benefits during March 2003 to 2006 for a 
period of one year after their unemployment entry. We will begin with a brief description of 
transitions and shares on the labor market, before turning to the multivariate analysis. Figure 
1 shows smoothed hazard rates – the probabilities of an event occurring at each point of time, 
conditional until still being in registered unemployed – for the transitions of interest. Since 
entries into unemployment occurred during March, the end of a calendar year is reached 
around 270 to 300 days after unemployment entry. Note for an interpretation of the results 
that ordinate scales are not uniform. 
While the hazard rates are computed conditional on being still in the risk set, the cumulative 
incidence rate is an unconditional representation of transitions. Results are displayed in Panel I 
of Table 4 and measured in percent of all cohort members. For instance a cumulative incidence 
of 18 for transitions into programs up to the end of 2nd quarter implies, that 6 month after 
unemployment entry 18 percent of all members of the cohort have taken up at least one ac-
tive labor market program (while they were in the realm of the Social Code III and excluding 
persons who founded a subsidized business). The incidence of transitions into program variants 
does not sum up to the overall incidence of program entry, since one person may participate in 
more than one program. Information on shares of individuals at the end of each quarter, also 
measured in percent of cohort members, can be found in Panel II of Table 4. Finally, Panel III 
documents mean duration of the programs investigated.  
A first result is that participation in active labor market programs – measured as percent of all 
analyzed entries into unemployment – in the realm of the Social Code III have decreased after 
2004 (Table 4, Panel I-A): While more than 26 percent of all unemployment benefit recipients 
entering unemployment in March 2003 and March 2004 took part in at least one program 
(excluding start-up subsidies) during the first year of their spell, only 19 percent did so in 
2005. However, shares increased again to 25 percent in 2006. Thus in particular the 2005 
cohort stands out as a group with low program participation. This is displayed also in the aver-
age share in programs (Table 4, Panel II-A). In contrast, if we condition on being still in the risk 
set, the transition rate into programs seems to be overall highest in 2006 (Figure 1-A). These 
results are in line with our first hypotheses stated in Section 3 – while incentives set by the 
per-capita transfer were influential for the 2005 cohort, the Public Employment Service 
counter-steered during 2006. However, another possible reason will be depicted below – exits 
out of unemployment were in particular high across the 2006 cohort, thus fewer individuals 
remained in the risk set, which also increased their participation prospects. 
We find some support for our second hypothesis that less long programs has been granted for 
the 2005 cohort (Figure 1-B2). Looking at particular programs, Figure 1 (C1-C4) confirms that 
transition rates into wages subsidy and further vocational training programs were compara-
tively low during the years 2004 and 2005. However, the risk to enter one of these programs 
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was even higher for the 2006 cohort than for the 2003 cohort. In contrast, public job creation 
schemes were less and less utilized in the realm of the Social Code III over years. We find thus 
no general evidence that longer and more expensive measures as wage subsidies and further 
vocational training programs has been substituted through cheap short training programs, as 
has been stated also in our second hypothesis. However, Figure 1 shows also that high transi-
tion rates into active labor market programs for the 2006 cohort mentioned above are mostly 
a result of high transition rates into short programs (Figure 1-B1). As can be seen also from 
Table 4 (Panels III-C1 and III-C2) the average duration of wage subsidies and further voca-
tional training programs has decreased over time – for the latter from 299 days for the 2003 
cohort to 119 days for the 2006 cohort. 
Our third hypothesis stated that programs might have started earlier during an unemployment 
spell for the 2005 and 2006 cohort. This is not confirmed by the empirical evidence: The inci-
dence of program entries is generally highest during the first quarter of unemployment in the 
cohorts investigated (Table 4, Panel I-A), while the transition rate – conditional on still being 
unemployed – is highest during the third quarter after unemployment entry (Figure 1-A). This 
might, however, be different for cohorts entering unemployment during another month than 
March. 
Finally, we will also have a look at entries into the realm of the Social Code II and exits out of 
unemployment and program participation. While around 13 percent of the 2004 cohort – the 
first cohort that might enter the realm of the Social Code II during our observation window – 
was registered as unemployed needy jobseekers at the end of the observation period, this was 
the case only for around 4 percent of the 2006 cohort (Table 4, Panel II-D). The sharp differ-
ence is probably partly due to an introductory effect and partly due to increasing exits from 
unemployment.  
Then at the same time exits out of unemployment gained importance: The cumulated percent 
of those exiting registered unemployment at least once up to the end of the year amounted to 
65 percent across the 2003 cohort and increased up to 78 percent across the 2006 cohort 
(Table 4, Panel I-E). The development over time is reflected also in the shares: The percent of 
those no longer registered as unemployed one year after unemployment entry increased re-
markably from 46 percent in the 2003 cohort to 63 percent in the 2006 cohort (Table 4, Panel 
II-E). The increase in exits from unemployment occurred mainly already during the first quarter 
after unemployment entry (see also Figure 1-E). It is ambiguous at the current state of knowl-
edge, in as far the labor market reforms or rather international business cycle effects have 
contributed to this development.  
Note that the figures above are slightly larger than those obtained by Rothe (2007) for all 
individuals who were unemployed at the beginning of 2004. He estimated that the probability 
to leave unemployment within the year 2004 amounted to 61 percent for West Germany re-
spectively 54 percent for East Germany for those who were unemployed at the beginning of 
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the year. This is, however, not surprising, since our analysis covers only persons during the first 
year of an unemployment spell.  
5.2 Multivariate analysis 
Since now we have only examined the timing of entries into programs. In the following we will 
investigate how the transition rate into programs is correlated with individual characteristics, 
to test the fourth hypothesis formulated in Section 3. Table 5 shows estimates of a piecewise-
constant exponential hazard model. Estimates are again performed for all programs, separately 
by program duration and program variant as well as for transitions into basic social care and 
out of unemployment. 
Estimated time effects (reference is the first quarter after unemployment entry for the 2003 
cohort) mirror those from Figure 1. The overall hazard rate of program entry is typically highest 
during the third quarter – at the end of the calendar year – after start of the unemployment 
episode. The 2006 cohort is outstanding in as far as the transition rate is in particular high 
during the first three quarters after unemployment entry. 
Turning to the socio-demographic characteristics, the overall transition rate into programs is 
slightly higher in East Germany. In particular hazard rates to participate in a “longer” program, 
to take-up subsidized regular employment or to join a job creation scheme were higher, while 
those of participating in a further vocational training program were lower. Foreigners as well 
as persons with disablements and health problems had lower hazard rates to enter any labor 
market program. The only exceptions are public job creation schemes, where persons with 
disablements and health problems have comparatively high prospects of participation. 
Compared to the reference group of unmarried men, we find that in fact married men had 
significantly higher transition rates into programs, while those of married women are signifi-
cantly lower. The differences are especially noticeable for longer programs, in and in particular 
for participation in wage subsidy and further vocational training programs. We wanted to test 
the hypothesis, if married men received more and married women less programs after the re-
forms took place. However, we do not find evidence of such shifts in overall transition prob-
abilities. 
Unemployed persons without a school leaving certificate and/or without vocational training 
have significant lower transition rates into active labor market programs than those with at 
least a low secondary degree (“Hauptschule”) and/or vocational training. But contrary to our 
expectations, their overall participation prospects in “longer” programs have improved in 2005 
and 2006. In particular further training was granted for those without a school leaving certifi-
cate, while wage subsidies were utilized to support those without vocational training. Note 
furthermore that persons with an intermediate secondary degree (“Realschule”) or higher sec-
ondary degree (“Gymnasium”) have even better prospects of program participation than those 
with a low secondary degree. 
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Table 5:  
Piecewise-constant exponential hazard model for transitions during one year after entry into unemployment benefit receipt (cohorts March 2003-2006) 
Reference: 1st quarter 2003, West Germany, unmarried man, German, not disabled, Lower secondary degree (“Hauptschule”), vocational training, age 25-29, during 2-years- history no 
participation in active labor market programs, no periods of sickness, no sanctions and up to 1 month unemployed. 
 
 
  
A.  
Any  
program  
B1.  
Program 
<100 days 
B2.  
Program 
≥100 days 
C1.  
Wage 
subsidy 
C2.  
Further 
training 
C3.  
Public job 
creation 
C4.  
Short 
training 
D.  
Basic social 
care 
E.  
Not  
unemployed 
F.  
Mixed 
model A. 
1st quarter * cohort 2004 0.30 ** 0.35 ** -0.03   -0.69 ** 0.14 ** -0.62 ** 0.04 * -   0.07 ** 0.34 ** 
1st quarter * cohort 2005 -0.18 ** -0.07 ** -0.80 ** -0.81 ** -0.58 ** -2.05 ** -0.27 ** -  0.24 ** -0.26 ** 
1st quarter * cohort 2006 0.09 ** 0.18 ** -0.37 ** -0.29 ** 0.20 ** -1.65 ** -0.03   0.05   0.42 ** 0.02   
2nd quarter * cohort 2003 0.01 ** -0.30 ** 0.48 ** 0.34 ** -0.08 ** 0.84 ** -0.38 ** -   -0.09 ** 0.01 ** 
2nd quarter * cohort 2004 0.08 ** 0.06 ** 0.19 ** 0.07   -0.05   -0.02   -0.25 ** -  -0.04 ** 0.53 ** 
2nd quarter * cohort 2005 -0.28 ** -0.23 ** -0.42 ** 0.00   -0.55 ** -1.60 ** -0.47 ** 0.08 ** 0.12 ** -0.09 ** 
2nd quarter * cohort 2006 0.31 ** 0.26 ** 0.54 ** 0.77 ** 0.69 ** -0.73 ** -0.09 ** -0.53 ** 0.20 ** 0.67 ** 
3rd quarter * cohort 2003 0.28 ** -0.02   0.90 ** 0.24 ** 0.51 ** 1.36 ** -0.12 ** -   -0.26 ** 0.93 ** 
3rd quarter * cohort 2004 0.15 ** 0.10 ** 0.35 ** 0.01   0.14 * -0.12   -0.25 ** -  -0.18 ** 0.97 ** 
3rd quarter * cohort 2005 0.06 * 0.09 ** 0.04   0.29 ** -0.02   -1.40 ** -0.21 ** 0.43 ** -0.01   0.58 ** 
3rd quarter * cohort 2006 0.54 ** 0.41 ** 0.78 ** 1.01 ** 0.97 ** -2.07 ** 0.06 * -0.05   0.04 ** 1.45 ** 
4th quarter * cohort 2003 -0.19 ** -0.41 ** 0.47 ** 0.00   -0.24 ** 0.25 ** -0.70 ** -  -0.53 ** 0.78 ** 
4th quarter * cohort 2004 -0.76 ** -0.87 ** 0.12 * 0.04   -1.22 ** -0.69 ** -1.32 ** -  -0.40 ** 0.32 ** 
4th quarter * cohort 2005 -0.57 ** -0.61 ** 0.00   0.49 ** -0.72 ** -1.77 ** -0.86 ** 0.80 ** -0.12 ** 0.21 ** T
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4th quarter * cohort 2006 -0.31 ** -0.48 ** 0.60 ** 1.09 ** 0.04   -1.57 ** -0.79 ** 0.40 ** -0.06 ** 1.03 ** 
East Germany 0.03 ** -0.10 ** 0.40 ** 0.72 ** -0.26 ** 1.71 ** -0.14 ** 0.19 ** -0.01 * -0.04 ** 
Foreigner -0.14 ** -0.12 ** -0.19 ** -0.55 ** -0.31 ** -0.39 ** -0.17 ** 0.29 ** -0.10 ** -0.17 ** 
Slightly disabled -0.18 ** -0.23 ** -0.05   -0.31 ** -0.25 ** 0.48 ** -0.21 ** -0.10   -0.14 ** -0.23 ** 
Severly disabled -0.17 ** -0.33 ** 0.20 ** -1.14 ** -0.13   1.23 ** -0.26 ** 0.04   -0.07 ** -0.21 ** 
Health problems -0.45 ** -0.42 ** -0.46 ** -0.62 ** -0.56 ** -0.06   -0.39 ** 0.15 ** -0.23 ** -0.60 ** 
Unmarried woman 0.04 ** 0.03 ** -0.02   -0.10 ** 0.00   -0.05   0.04 ** 0.19 ** -0.22 ** 0.06 ** 
Married man 0.06 ** 0.00   0.20 ** 0.44 ** 0.16 ** 0.03   -0.02   -0.15 ** 0.07 ** 0.08 ** 
    * cohort 2004 0.00   0.05   -0.03   -0.04   0.00   -0.14   0.04   -   0.04 ** -0.01   
    * cohort 2005 -0.02   0.03   -0.07   -0.23 ** -0.08   -0.14   0.05   -   0.07 ** -0.02   
    * cohort 2006 0.03   0.08 ** -0.02   -0.05   -0.07   -0.15   0.07 * 0.00   0.08 ** 0.05   
Married woman -0.14 ** -0.15 ** -0.14 ** -0.20 ** -0.16 ** -0.09   -0.10 ** -0.70 ** -0.30 ** -0.18 ** 
    * cohort 2004 0.02   0.05   -0.09 * -0.16   -0.08   -0.08   0.01   -   -0.06 ** 0.05   
    * cohort 2005 0.05   0.08 ** -0.16 ** -0.38 ** -0.07   0.17   0.04   -   -0.19 ** 0.11 ** 
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    * cohort 2006 0.08 ** 0.10 ** 0.00   -0.20 * -0.03   -0.42   0.07 * -0.11 * -0.17 ** 0.15 ** 
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 Table 5 continued 
A.  
Any  
program  
B1.  
Program 
<100 days 
B2.  
Program 
≥100 days 
C1.  
Wage 
subsidy 
C2.  
Further 
training 
C3.  
Public job 
creation 
C4.  
Short 
training 
D.  
Basic so-
cial care 
E.  
Not  
unemployed 
F.  
Mixed 
model A. 
Without schooling certificate -0.20 ** -0.15 ** -0.23 ** -0.31 ** -0.62 ** 0.16   -0.13 ** 0.10 ** -0.09 ** -0.30 ** 
    * cohort 2004 0.05   0.04   -0.06   0.14   -0.04   -0.12   0.02   -  -0.03   0.08   
    * cohort 2005 0.10 * 0.01   0.18   -0.04   0.60 ** 0.60   -0.09   -  0.02   0.16 ** 
    * cohort 2006 0.15 ** 0.07   0.26 ** -0.03   0.57 ** 0.44   0.00   0.03   -0.01   0.24 ** 
Intermediate secondary degree 0.11 ** 0.07 ** 0.25 ** 0.14 ** 0.44 ** 0.16 ** 0.06 ** -0.21 ** -0.01   0.15 ** 
Higher secondary degree 0.10 ** 0.03 * 0.41 ** 0.08   0.58 ** 0.12   0.01   -0.33 ** 0.00   0.16 ** 
Without vocational training -0.16 ** -0.10 ** -0.21 ** -0.59 ** 0.05   -0.01   -0.08 ** 0.54 ** -0.20 ** -0.18 ** 
    * cohort 2004 0.03   -0.07 * 0.17 ** -0.03   -0.03   0.13   -0.10 ** -  -0.07 ** 0.02   
    * cohort 2005 0.07 ** -0.03   0.32 ** 0.27 * -0.37 ** -0.03   -0.13 ** -  -0.11 ** 0.08 * 
    * cohort 2006 0.10 ** 0.00   0.20 ** 0.34 ** -0.19 ** 0.15   -0.11 ** 0.03   -0.05 ** 0.12 ** 
University degree -0.15 ** -0.18 ** 0.01   -0.39 ** -0.02   0.09   -0.16 ** -0.33 ** 0.02   -0.20 ** 
Age 30-34 0.01   0.02   -0.02   -0.17 ** 0.07 * -0.11   0.03   0.05 * -0.04 ** 0.01   
Age 35-39 0.04 ** 0.05 ** 0.02   -0.26 ** 0.17 ** -0.02   0.04 * -0.02   -0.09 ** 0.05 ** 
Age 40-44 0.01   0.03 * -0.01   -0.25 ** 0.14 ** 0.03   0.00   -0.09 ** -0.10 ** 0.01   
Age 45-49 -0.05 ** -0.02   -0.15 ** -0.32 ** -0.03   0.15 * -0.06 ** -0.37 ** -0.22 ** -0.07 ** 
Age 50-54 -0.13 ** -0.30 ** 0.12 ** 0.28 ** -0.56 ** 0.33 ** -0.32 ** -0.75 ** -0.47 ** -0.16 ** 
    * cohort 2004 -0.11 ** 0.07   -0.40 ** -0.22 * -0.01   0.01   0.02   -   0.03   -0.18 ** 
    * cohort 2005 -0.04   0.10 * -0.09   -0.08   0.30 ** 0.34   0.06   -   0.07 ** -0.03   
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    * cohort 2006 0.12 ** 0.20 ** 0.12 * -0.02   0.49 ** 0.74 ** 0.15 ** 0.24 ** 0.17 ** 0.14 ** 
Labor market program(s) 0.14 ** 0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.29 ** 0.07 * 0.08   0.10 ** 0.41 ** -0.24 ** 0.24 ** 
Period(s) of sickness -0.06 ** -0.07 ** -0.08 * -0.03   -0.02   -0.02   -0.08 ** -0.03   -0.07 ** -0.07 ** 
Sanction(s) -0.18 ** -0.15 * -0.24 * -0.71 ** -0.37 * 0.13   -0.18 * 0.46 ** -0.24 ** -0.18 * 
Unemployed 1-6 months -0.19 ** -0.19 ** -0.08 ** -0.03   -0.14 ** 0.09   -0.18 ** 0.44 ** 0.31 ** -0.33 ** 
Unemployed 7-12 months -0.32 ** -0.35 ** -0.17 ** -0.04   -0.41 ** 0.10   -0.35 ** 1.06 ** 0.15 ** -0.47 ** 
Unemployed 13-18 months -0.52 ** -0.58 ** -0.33 ** -0.27 ** -0.50 ** -0.34 ** -0.61 ** 1.31 ** -0.23 ** -0.70 ** 
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Unemployed 19-24 months -0.36 ** -0.70 ** 0.05   -0.43 * 0.70 ** -0.36   -0.84 ** 1.68 ** -0.45 ** -0.22 * 
 
 Constant -6.31 ** -6.44 ** -8.23 ** -9.05 ** -8.61 ** -10.76 ** -6.51 ** -7.66 ** -5.34 ** -6.06 ** 
Log Likelihood Model -250809 -224890 -85061 -36509 -57704 -16261 -186896 -53671 -477623 -250346 
Log Likelihood restricted model -255611 -229558 -88452 -39035 -59957 -19254 -190436 -58736 -495887 -255213 
Number of persons 318756 318756 318756 318756 318756 318756 318756 141577 318756 318756 
Number of events 78403 64918 20621 7465 11518 3252 49530 15513 225044 78403 
Source: TrEffeR data set of the German Public Employment Service (own calculations). 
Only program entries while in the realm of the Social Code III; transitions into start-up subsidy programs are excluded. Individuals may enter more than one program variant during their 
unemployment spell. Duration until program entry is censored at unemployment exit and at exit into realm of Social Code II.  *) α = 0.05, **) α = 0.01. 
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Our reference age group is those of age 25 to 29. It is obvious that hazard rates to enter a 
program decrease for those older than 45 – an exception are public job creation schemes. The 
interaction terms show, however, that for older workers between 50 and 54 chances of overall 
program participation were also highest across the 2006 cohort. 
Exploring the relationship between program participation and labor market history of individu-
als, it becomes obvious that participation induces participation – overall transition rates into 
programs are significantly higher for those who had already participated earlier. This is the 
case in particular for those taking up subsidized job. Those who have in the past experienced 
periods of sickness or sanctions are less likely to enter a treatment. Furthermore, hazard rates 
of program entry are shrinking with increasing unemployment experiences during the last 
years before unemployment entry.  
Summing up, transition rates into programs are generally lower for hard-to-place individuals. 
We find, however, no support for our fourth hypothesis stated in Section 3, that participation 
prospects were in particular worse for the 2005 cohort. Overall participation chances have 
even improved for hard-to-place persons within the post-reform cohorts compared to the pre-
reform cohorts. 
Additional estimates investigate the risk to enter the realm of the Social Code II (starting with 
the 2005 cohort) or to exit unemployment during the observation period. Not surprisingly, the 
risk to change into basic social care receipt is highest during the last quarter of the one-year-
period analyzed. Transition rates are particularly low for married women and particularly high 
for those without vocational training; they decrease strongly with age.  
Regarding exits from unemployment, the estimates confirm again that the transition rate out 
of unemployment is highest during the first quarter after unemployment entry and has in-
creased considerably in 2005 and 2006. Compared to unmarried men, a lower transition rate 
out of registered unemployment is found for married – but also unmarried – women, while 
unemployment exits occur in fact more often across married men. Furthermore, persons with-
out school leaving certificate and/or without vocational training as well as “older” age groups 
leave unemployment less often.  
Finally, some caveats are in order: We have made the simplifying assumption that the ana-
lyzed hazards are constant over quarters after unemployment entry and that all individual 
characteristics considered in the estimates shift the hazard rate proportionally constant over 
time. Furthermore, competing risks are present in our analysis (see the discussion in Section 4). 
In particular individuals might register out of unemployment or – since 2005 – pass over into 
basic social care before entering a program in the realm of the Social Code III. Estimates of a 
mixed model (Table 5, Panel F), taking into account unobserved heterogeneity following a 
gamma-distribution, converged only for transitions into overall program participation, but – 
probably due to a comparatively low number of events – not for single program variants. Re-
garding transitions into all programs, estimated coefficients for individual characteristics were 
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similar to the estimates discussed above. Estimates of time effects, however, were generally 
higher taking into account unobserved heterogeneity. Since we observe much more exits from 
unemployment than entries into basic social care, this can be taken as a hint that in fact those 
with a-priori higher probabilities of program entry are also those who leave registered unem-
ployment rather early. 
Conclusions 
The allocation of unemployed persons into active labor market programs is a complex issue. 
While the legal framework and the institutional setting are the result of political decisions, the 
internal governance of the Public Employment Service has a lot of discretion regarding the 
implementation of programs. Our research was motivated by the fact that the introduction of 
a per-capita transfer from the unemployment insurance to the government’s budget – due for 
transitions from insurance-funded unemployment benefits to tax-funded basic social care – 
raised several concerns: It was blamed to set perverse incentives for the Social Code III branch 
of the Public Employment Service when allocating unemployed benefit recipients into active 
labor market programs. Since an incentive was set to grant program participation if the in-
vestment could be supposed to pay out in terms of an avoidance of the pay-capita transfer, 
programs might have been in particular less accessible for in particular married women, unem-
ployed persons with low qualification and older individuals. While introduced in the course of 
the German labor market reforms in 2005, the per-capita payment has only recently been 
abolished. 
We investigate empirically what happened to four cohorts of individuals entering registered 
unemployment during March 2003 to 2006 and receiving unemployment benefits at the be-
ginning of their unemployment spell. Our primary interest was to analyze entries of these co-
horts into active labor market programs, while financing responsibilities for these programs lay 
in the realm of the unemployment insurance. The observation period is restricted to one year 
after unemployment entry. 
Summing up, we find some evidence for the first and second hypotheses stated in Section 3. 
First, transition rates of unemployment benefit recipients into programs have been low in 
2005, but increased again considerably in 2006. On the one hand the 2006 cohort experienced 
comparatively high exit rates out of unemployment, what then increased participation pros-
pects of those remaining unemployed. On the other hand an important reason is certainly the 
active counter-steering of the Social Code III branch of the Public Employment Service during 
the year 2006, which devoted additional funds to active labor market programs and put sev-
eral additional programs for hard-to-place individuals into action (see Section 3). Second, the 
decrease in transition rates observed for the 2005 cohort resulted mainly from fewer entries 
into programs of long duration. It should be also noted that high transition rates into pro-
grams across the 2006 cohort went hand in hand with in average shorter program durations – 
in particular for further vocational training programs – compared to previous years. Taken 
together this may be taken as a hint that the per-capita transfer – that was due for each tran-
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sition from unemployment benefits into basic social care – has in fact contributed to reduce 
participation in active labor market programs for the 2005 cohort of unemployment benefit 
recipients, while the 2006 cohort experienced no reduced transition rates (but still shortened 
program durations). 
We find, however, no support for the third and fourth hypotheses. Third, our findings do not 
confirm that program entries have occurred generally earlier during an unemployment-spell in 
the post-reform cohorts. Fourth, the results of our event history analysis indicate that groups 
with placement difficulties – these are in particular foreign, disabled, less qualified and older 
unemployed persons, but also married women – had rather lower transition rates into pro-
grams during the entire observation period. Exceptions are transitions into public job creation 
schemes, which are observed comparatively often for several groups of hard-to-place individu-
als. However, overall participation prospects of low-qualified persons, of older persons be-
tween 50 and 54 and slightly also of married women even increased for the post-reform co-
horts compared to the pre-reform cohorts.  
As a caveat it should be taken in mind that findings might be different for those groups that 
were not included in our analysis. These are in particular unemployed persons up to 25 or older 
than 55, unemployed persons from local labor market areas with municipalities opting out of 
the cooperation with the Public Employment Service as well as persons entering unemploy-
ment during another month than March. 
Our topic was the transition rate of unemployed persons in active labor market programs in a 
specific institutional setting. But in a broader context, selectivity into programs must be as-
sessed hand in hand with questions of program effectiveness and efficiency. The most impor-
tant goal of these programs is certainly to improve employment prospects of participants, or at 
least their employability. Thus program allocation should be based strongly on effectiveness 
considerations. In fact, empirical studies observe a strong heterogeneity of estimated treat-
ment effects across program variants as well as across particular groups of unemployed per-
sons.  
The German government argued that financial arrangements that were in place in Germany 
during the years 2005 to 2007 – investments into an active labor market program had to pay 
off before a transfer from unemployment benefits to basic social care occurred – would set an 
incentive for effective program allocation. In fact these arrangements fostered short-term 
considerations and did not take effectiveness issues seriously. Any serious attempt to imple-
ment effectiveness considerations into program allocation requires estimates of a counterfac-
tual situation – what would have happened to participants if they had not or only later taken-
up a program. As a consequence, with TrEffeR an on-going monitoring tool for a comprehen-
sive evaluation of program effectiveness has recently been developed by the German Public 
Employment Service. 
 IAB-Discussion Paper 15/2008 
 
29 
References 
Adamy, W. (2005), Nach Hartz IV: Gespaltene Haushalte für die Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Soziale 
Sicherheit 1/2005, 2-12. 
Baumgartner, H., Caliendo, M. (2007), Turning Unemployment into Self-Employment, Effec-
tiveness and Efficiency of Two Start-Up Programmes, DIW Discussion Paper 671. 
Bender, B., Bieber, D., Hielscher, V., Marschall, J., Ochs, P, Vaut, S. (2006), Organisatorischer 
Umbau der Bundesagentur für Arbeit, Evaluation der Maßnahmen zur Umsetzung der Vor-
schläge der Hartz-Kommission, Arbeitspaket 2, Evaluationsbericht 2006 im Auftrag des Bun-
desministeriums für Arbeit und Soziales (BMAS), Berlin. 
Bernhard, S., Hohmeyer, K., Jozwiak, E., Koch, S., Kruppe, T., Stephan, G., Wolff, J. (2008), Aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Deutschland und ihre Wirkungen, IAB-Forschungsbericht 2/2008. 
Bernhard, S., Wolff, J. (2008), Contracting out placement services in Germany. Is assignment to 
private providers effective for needy job-seekers?, IAB-Discussion-Paper 5/2008. 
Biewen, M., Fitzenberger, B., Osikominu, A., Waller, M. (2007), Which Program for Whom? Evi-
dence on the Comparative Effectiveness of Public Sponsored Training Programs in Germany, 
IZA Discussion Paper 2885, Bonn. 
Caliendo, M., Hujer, R., Thomsen, S. (2005a), The Employment Effect of Job Creation Schemes 
in Germany, A Microeconometric Evaluation, IZA Discussion Paper 1512, forthcoming in: Ad-
vances in Econometrics. 
Caliendo, M., Hujer, R., Thomsen, S. (2005b), Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve the 
Efficiency of Job Creation Schemes in Germany, IAB Discussion Paper No. 8/05, forthcoming in: 
Applied Economics. 
Caliendo, M., Hujer, R. and Thomsen, S. (2006), Sectoral Heterogeneity in the Employment 
Effects of Job Creation Schemes in Germany, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 
226, 139-179. 
Deutscher Bundestag (2007), Antrag der Abgeordneten Kornelia Möller, Volker Schneider 
(Saarbrücken), Dr. Barbara Höll, Dr. Petra Sitte, Werner Dreibus, Cornelia Hirsch, Ulla Lötzer, Dr. 
Herbert Schui, Dr. Axel Troost, Sabine Zimmermann und der Fraktion DIE LINKE: Der berufli-
chen Weiterbildung den notwendigen Stellenwert einräumen, Drucksache 16/7527, 
12.12.2007. 
Fitzenberger, B., Osikominu, A., Völter, R. (2006), Get training or wait? Long-run employment 
effects of training programs for the unemployed in West Germany, IAB Discussion Paper 
17/2006. 
Fitzenberger, B., Völter, R. (2007), Long-run effects of training programs for the unemployed in 
East Germany, Labour Economics 14, 370-755. 
Hohmeyer, K., Wolff, J. (2007), A fistful of Euros, Does One-Euro-Job participation lead means-
tested benefit recipients into regular jobs and out of unemployment benefit II receipt?, IAB-
Discussion Paper 32/2007. 
Hujer, R., Thomsen, S. (2006), How Do Employment Effects of Job Creation Schemes Differ with 
Respect to the Foregoing Unemployment Duration, ZEW Discussion Paper 06-047. 
Jaenichen, U. (2000), Selektivität beim Zugang in Förderung durch betriebliche Einstellungshil-
fen, Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 33, 445-461. 
 IAB-Discussion Paper 15/2008 
 
30 
Jaenichen, U., Stephan, G. (2007), The Effectiveness of Targeted Wage Subsidies for Hard-to-
Place Workers, IAB Discussion Paper 16/2007. 
Konle-Seidl, R. (2008), Changes in the governance of employment servides in Germany since 
2003, IAB Discussion Paper 10/2008. 
Kruppe, T. (2008), Selektivität bei der Einlösung von Bildungsgutscheinen, mimeo. 
Lancaster, Tony (1990), The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge.  
Lechner, M., Miquel, R., Wunsch, C. (2005), Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored Train-
ing in West Germany, IAB Discussion Paper 03/2005. 
Lechner, M., Miquel, R., Wunsch, C. (2007), The Curse and Blessing of Training the Unemployed 
in a Changing Economy: The Case of East Germany after Unification, German Economic Review 
8, 468-509. 
Rinne, U., Schneider, M., Uhlendorff, A. (2007), Too Bad to Benefit? Effect Heterogeneity of 
Public Training Programs, IZA Discussion Paper 3240. 
Rothe, T. (2007), Wege aus der Arbeitslosigkeit – Wege in die Beschäftigung, Sozialer Fort-
schritt 7-8/2007, 187-193. 
Stephan, G., Rässler, S., Schewe, T. (2006), Das TrEffeR-Projekt der Bundesagentur für Arbeit. 
Die Wirkung von Maßnahmen aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik, Zeitschrift für Arbeitsmarktfor-
schung 39, 447-466. 
Winterhager, H., Heinze, A., Spermann, A. (2006), Deregulatin job placement in Europe: A mic-
roecnometric evaluation of an innovative voucher scheme in Germany, Labour Economics 13, 
505-517. 
Wolff, J., Jozwiak, E. (2007), Does short-term training activate means-tested unemployment 
benefit recipients in Germany?, IAB Discussion Paper 29/2007. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Cambridge 
(MA) / London. 
 
Recently published 
No. Author(s) Title Date 
27/2007 Brücker, H. 
Schröder, P.J.H. 
International migration with heterogeneous agents: The-
ory and evidence 
10/07 
28/2007 Krug, G. In-work benefits for low wage jobs: Can additional in-
come hinder labor market integration? 
11/07 
29/2007 Wolff, J. 
Jozwiak, E. 
Does short-term training activate means-tested unem-
ployment benefit recipients in Germany? 
11/07 
30/2007 König, M. 
Möller, J. 
Mindestlohneffekte des Entsendegesetzes? : Eine Mikro-
datenanalyse für die deutsche Bauwirtschaft 
11/07 
32/2007 Hohmeyer, K. 
Wolff, J.  
A fistful of Euros: Does One-Euro-Job participation lead 
means-tested benefit recipients into regular jobs and out 
of unemployment benefit II receipt? 
12/07 
1/2008 Schnitzlein, D. Verbunden über Generationen: Struktur und Ausmaß der 
intergenerationalen Einkommensmobilität in Deutschland 
1/08 
2/2008 Bauer, T. K. 
Schmucker, A. 
Vorell, M. 
KMU und Arbeitsplatzdynamik: Eine Analyse auf Basis 
der Beschäftigten-Historik-Datei  
1/08 
3/2008 Baas, T. 
Brücker, H. 
Macroeconomic consequences of migration diversion: 
A CGE simulation for Germany and the UK  
1/08 
4/2008 Amend, E. 
Herbst, P. 
Labor market pooling and human capital investment  
decisions 
1/08 
5/2008 Bernhard, S. 
Wolff, J. 
Contracting out placement services in Germany: Is as-
signment to private providers effective for needy job-
seekers?  
2/08 
6/2008 Lehmer, F. 
Ludsteck, J. 
The returns to job mobility and inter-regional migration 2/08 
7/2008 Klinger, S. 
Wolf, K. 
What explains changes in full-time and part-time em-
ployment in Western Germany? : A new method on an 
old question  
2/08 
8/2008 Hohmeyer, K. 
Jozwiak, E. 
Who is targeted by One-Euro-Jobs? : A selectivity analy-
sis  
2/08 
9/2008 Schnabel, C. 
Kohaut, S. 
Brixy, U. 
Employment stability of entrants in newly founded firms:  
A matching approach using linked employer-employee 
data from Germany  
2/08 
10/2008 Konle-Seidl, R. Changes in the governance of employment services in 
Germany since 2003  
2/08 
11/2008 Ludsteck, J. Adjustment from the bottom: Zoom evidence on the cycli-
cality of wages and the wage curve in West Germany  
2/08 
12/2008 Stephan, G. The effects of active labor market programs in Germany: 
An investigation using different definitions of non-treat-
ment  
2/08 
13/2008 Otto, A. 
Fornahl, D. 
Long-term growth determinants of young businesses in 
Germany: Effects of regional concentration and speciali-
sation  
3/08 
14/2008 Schank, T. 
Schnabel, C. 
Stephani, J. 
Geringverdiener: Wem und wie gelingt der Aufstieg? 3/08 
As per:  19.3.2008 
For a full list, consult the IAB website 
http://www.iab.de/de/publikationen/discussionpaper.aspx 
Imprint
IAB-Discussion Paper 15/2008
Editorial address
Institute for Employment Research 
of the Federal Employment Agency
Regensburger Str. 104
D-90478 Nuremberg
Editorial staff
Regina Stoll, Jutta Palm-Nowak
Technical completion
Jutta Sebald
All rights reserved
Reproduction and distribution in any form, also in parts, 
requires the permission of IAB Nuremberg
Website
http://www.iab.de
Download of this Discussion Paper
http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2008/dp1508.pdf
For further inquiries contact the authors:
Gesine Stephan
Phone  +49.911.179 5850
E-mail  gesine.stephan@iab.de 
Kathi Zickert
Phone  +49.911.179 3288
E-mail  kathi.zickert@iab.de
